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i
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\i

Trial Court No. 920-2330 CV

Defendant and Appellant.
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
This issue at hand involves no constitutional provisions
in dispute.
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IN THE UTAH COURT O F APPEALS
JJBAKD f

a Utah General

Partnership,

APPELLEE'S BRIEF

mi in I 1i" |i i| in I 1 I i ,

Tl a i ml i I 1

iii

Il I

1 1 1 0 <i 1 • I A

vs.
HOWARD F.

T r i a l Court No. 920-2 33 0 CV

HATCH,

De f e n d a n t

and

Appe11ant.

JURISDICTION
The I Jtah C : I n : t • : f A ppea ] s 1 las ji n : ::! 3d :i c .ti ::: i i ::: •::!!: tl: :n ::! s
pursuant

I :> Utah

Code Annotated

Section

78-2A-3 (2) (d) < if

Utah

Judicial Code.

STATEMENT O F T H E CASE
N a t u r e of t h e Case.
Appellee filed a :oi" :
evicting t h e Appelle

It

on or about July 22, 1992,

; i :i tl: I the Ti hill r III t I m I In pur pi ISIJ» up

^nd his mob Lie huiiii.

n R, , ij i

Appellant's

mobi .*. noire was occupying one of i.he lots in Appellee's mobile home
• M o b i 1 p I In in i 1 III1 n i h " i if \ t n l i 11 I i i

pi:

Utah County, U t a h .

T h e grounds for t h e lawsuit Included t h e fact

that Appellant had been served a fifteen-day rule violation notice
o

* " hereafter

served .,i t'hroe-

day lease termination notice for repeated failure t.o comply ''* it.li
mob: . home p a r k rules o n or about July
f j f*

provide

y ni III I

mi r I I a / t ii o i l n o t i c e * w n i .

LI'it' care of the lawns

"he basis for t h e
1 had fan l e d t o

and landscaping

around t h e

subject leased premises thus creating a health and f:i re hazard, w a s

maintaining unapproved storage sheds and enclosures on the premises
and was storing miscellaneous items around the premises not in
proper storage, failed to provide proper skirting and coverage over
the mobile home hitch/tongue and mobile home; and was maintaining
an unlicensed vehicle in the park, all of which were violations of
specific rules by which the Appellant was obligated to abide. The
three-day lease termination notice for repeated failure to comply
was served on Appellant for the identical violations set forth in
the fifteen-day notice. Appellant also owed rent for July, 1992 in
the amount of $170.00 which was the fair market value of the leased
premises.

Appellee,

therefore,

sought

judgment

against

the

Appellant for termination of the lease and immediate restitution
and possession of the leased premises, unpaid rent for July, 1992
and rent at the rate of $5.48 per day until judgment was entered
and restitution was granted and for costs and attorney's fees as
provided for in the lease agreement.
On or about August 24, 1992, Appellant filed an answer
and counterclaim. (R. 31)
signed

the

lease

Appellant raised as a defense that he

agreement

with

the

Appellee

under duress.

Appellant raised as an affirmative defense that he was never
subject to the provisions of the lease agreement or the rules.
Appellant

in

his

counterclaim

alleged

that

the

rules

and

regulations of the park were unreasonable and unduly burdensome and
without proper legal basis. He further alleged in the counterclaim
that these rules were null and void as to him and his mobile home
located in the park.

Accordingly, Appellant alleged that he was
2

entitled to special damages and punitive damages for being required
to live by the park rules.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

On August 31, 1992, after

Appellant's answer was filed, Appellee filed a certificate of
readiness for trial and request for trial setting.(R. 37)

On

September 1, 1992, the Court ordered that the matter be set for
pre-trial conference. (R. 38)

On September 11, 1992, Appellee

filed a motion for the Court for a landlord's possession bond. (R.
44)

The grounds for the motion was that Appellant had not paid

rent for July, August, and September, 1992, and was currently in
default of said rental payments. On September 14, 1992, the Court
ordered that Appellee file a possession bond in the form of a cash
bond in the amount of $5,000.00 (R. 45), and a notice of the
possession bond was served on Appellant.

(R. 102)

Appellant

demanded a hearing as provided for in the Forcible Entry and
Detainer Act, Utah Code Annotated Section 78-36-8.5(2) (R. 54), and
the hearing was held on September 22, 1992 at the hour of 11:00
a.m. (R. 57)

(For full citation of the Forcible Entry and Detainer

Act, see Addendum "GM.)

Appellee was represented by its counsel,

James R. Boud, and Appellant appeared personally at the hearing.
Arguments were heard by Appellee and Appellant and the Court
ordered specifically that Appellant could retain possession of the
premises upon posting a counter-bond in the form of cash or a
cashier's check in the amount of $3,500.00.

The Court indicated

the necessity of the bond due to the reason that a counterclaim had
been filed, and a jury trial had been demanded by Appellant, both
3

of which could be lengthy and affected Appellant's right to an
expedient trial and could result in substantial fees and costs to
Appellant.

At said hearing Appellant acknowledged not having paid

rent for July, August, and September and was therefore ordered by
the Court to pay those rents into the Court as required by Utah
Code Annotated Section 57-16-8.

(See Order; Addendum "A".)

The

bond and the rents were to be paid by Appellant into Court by
Friday, September 25, 1992, at 5:00 p.m.

The Court ruled that if

Appellant did not pay the rent into the Court, then Appellee could
proceed with a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated Section 57-16-8.

Similarly, if the bond was not posted

timely, Appellee would be entitled
immediately thereafter.

to a writ of restitution

(See Order; Addendum "A".)

On or about October 1, 1992, Appellant filed a motion to
disqualify Judge Sumsion, the assigned judge to the case who had
ruled on the September 22, 1992 hearing. The basis for Appellant's
motion was that Judge Sumsion had been an attorney in the firm of
Sumsion & Park with whom " . . . this defendant has had a long and
bitter legal battle . . . "

and also on the grounds that Judge

Sumsion had made a statement at the September 22, 1992 hearing that
the case would not be a simple one.

Accordingly, Judge Sumsion

entered a minute entry on October 6, 1992, recusing himself from
the case. (See Addendum MB,f.)

On October 9, 1992, Judge Sumsion

entered a ruling on the motion stating he was recusing himself
because he would soon be retiring and the case may not reach final

4

disposition before his retirement date in two months. (See Addendum
"C".)
Appellant posted the bond timely as ordered by the Court
(R.

58)

but

failed

to

pay

rent

as

ordered

by

the

Court.

Accordingly, on October 15, 1992, Appellee filed a motion for
summary judgment. (R. 73)
parts.

The basis for this motion was in two

First, Appellant had acknowledged owing rents for July,

August, and September, 1992, and that said rents had not been paid.
The Court had ordered in the prior hearing of September 22, 1992,
that the rents must be paid and that Appellee could proceed with a
motion for summary judgment if they were not paid into Court.
Second, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 57-16-8, if a
resident of a mobile home park elects to contest an eviction
proceeding, all rents, fees, and service charges due and incurred
during the pending action shall be paid into the Court. Failure to
do so constitutes grounds for granting summary judgment in favor of
the mobile home park. The Court entered the order granting summary
judgment on October 19, 1992. (See Order; Addendum "D".)
On October 20, 1992, Appellant filed his memorandum in
opposition to motion for summary judgment claiming that payment of
rent was discretionary despite what the Court's earlier order had
been. (R. 90)

Appellant requested an oral argument.

On or about

November 3, 1992, Appellant filed his motion and memorandum to set
aside order. (R. 94)

The Court, therefore, scheduled a hearing

which was held on November 18, 1992, allowing oral argument on
Appellee's motion for summary judgment and on Appellant's motion to
5

set aside the order. (R. 103 and 104)

At the hearing the Court

heard arguments by both parties and ruled that summary judgment was
proper for the Appellee under Utah Code Annotated Section 57-16-8
and pursuant to Appellant's failure to abide by the September 22,
1992 order. (R. 116)

The Court found that summary judgment being

entered, Appellant's counterclaim was moot and therefore dismissed
the same.

Appellant then filed this appeal.
C.

Disposition at Trial Court.

Summary judgment was

granted in favor of the Appellee on November 18, 1992.

With the

filing of the summary judgment the Court found the Appellant's
counterclaim moot and dismissed the same.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There were no improprieties or prejudices by the Trial
Court judges in this case as argued by Appellant.

The initial

judge, Judge Sumsion, recused himself upon motion by the Appellant
because he was soon to be retiring and believed the case would not
be disposed of in its finality before his retirement date.

(See

minute

"C",

entry

respectively.)
prejudice

by

and

see

ruling

at

Addendums

"B"

and

This is certainly not grounds evidencing any
the

Judge.

In

any

event,

the

Judge

granted

Appellant's motion to recuse leaving nothing Appellant can point to
in the record that would cause the new judge to have any presumed
bias against the Appellant.

Furthermore, there is nothing on the

record that Appellant can identify that would show that Judge
McGuire was prejudiced or violated any statutes or otherwise acted
6

with impropriety towards the Appellant.

(See minute entry by Judge

McGuire at Addendum "E".)
Summary judgment was proper in this matter based upon
applicable Utah statutes giving the Court authority to grant
summary judgment in favor of the landlord where the tenant, in an
eviction action, elects to contest the action and fails to pay
rent.

Based on this statute alone, the Court had every right to

grant Appellee's summary judgment when the Appellant on his own
admission

failed to pay rent into the Court for five months

following the initiation of the lawsuit.

ARGUMENT
Appellee

sees

no

reason

to

respond

argument regarding Judge Sumsion's prejudice.

to

Appellantfs

Although Appellee

disagrees there was any prejudice by Judge Sumsion, the Judge did,
in fact, recuse himself without making any rulings relative to this
appeal. Accordingly, the alleged issue concerning Judge Sumsion's
supposed prejudice against Appellant was resolved upon recusing
himself.

Also, there is nothing on the record

showing any

prejudice by Judge McGuire. In fact, he made it very clear that he
did not know Mr. Hatch and had not talked about the case with any
of the other judges.

(See Addendum "E".)

Appellee, in review of the record, can find nothing that
would show that Judge McGuire violated any rules and regulations of
the Court by entering a summary judgment as argued by Appellant.
Although it appears from the record that the Court may have
7

inadvertently entered a ruling for judgment in favor of Appellee
prior to the expiration of ten days time for a response, as
required by Rule 4-501(2), Utah Code of Judicial Administration,
the Court corrected that error by allowing Appellant oral argument
and an opportunity to file a responsive pleading.

Appellant did

file a written response setting forth his arguments and was granted
a hearing. Oral argument was made before the Court on November 18,
1992, and Appellant had full opportunity to argue his objections.
Following argument, the Court ruled that summary judgment was
proper, not only because Appellant failed to pay rent as ordered
earlier, but also pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 57-16-8,
which reads as follows:
If a resident elects to contest an eviction proceeding,
all rents, fees, and service charges due and incurred
during the pendency of the action shall be paid into the
court according to the current mobile home park payment
schedule. Failure of the resident to pay such amounts,
in the discretion of the court, may constitute grounds
for granting summary judgment in favor of the mobile home
park. Upon final termination of the issues between the
parties, the court shall order all amounts paid into
court paid to the mobile home park. The prevailing party
is also entitled to court costs and reasonable attorney's
fees.
The Court ordered that pursuant to the above section, Appellee was
entitled to summary judgment, which included restitution of the
mobile home park premises, rent due and owing, and reasonable
attorney's fees. Appellant clearly was in violation of the statute
and the Court had every right to exercise its discretion to grant
summary judgment in favor of the Appellee.

The Judge very clearly

stated in a minute entry of November 9, 1992, that he had not
discussed the case with the previous judge who had recused himself,
8

Judge Sumsion, that he had no idea who the Appellant was nor the
Appellee or its attorneys or agents, and that he had no personal
interest in this matter except to exercise justice,
lf M

E .)

(See Addendum

There is simply nothing in the record that would indicate

that Judge McGuire was prejudiced and did anything other than
follow the applicable statutory provisions.

Because the issues

raised in Appellant's counterclaim were moot in light of the ruling
for summary judgment, the Court dismissed the counterclaim which
was within the Court's discretion.
As an additional matter, Appellant has filed an affidavit
of

impecuniosity

claiming

poverty

and

inability to bear the

expenses of appeal. Appellant, however, had no difficulty posting
a $3,500.00 bond within three days when so ordered by the Trial
Court.

Further, Appellant represented that he owned the subject

mobile home free and clear of any liens.

Appellee, therefore,

believes Appellant has the ability to bear his costs of appeal and
has not come before this Court with clean hands by stating
otherwise.

(See Addendum "H".)

CONCLUSION
Appellee

respectfully

requests

the

Court

to

deny

Appellant's request to have the case remanded to the lower court
and accordingly to uphold the summary judgment granted herein.

9

DATED this

'9

day of

1993.

ASHTON, BRAUNBERGER, POULSEN
& BOUD, P.C.

l/l^^—L
BY.
Jamefeyft. Boud
Attorney for Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Appellee's Brief was mailed postage prepaid on the
/t> day of May, 1993, to the following:
Howard Hatch
843 South 1150 East
Pleasant Grove, Utah

^Pv(r
06-97-bn
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James R. Boud, USB #A0388
ASHTON, BRAUNBERGER, POULSEN & BOUD, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
302 West 5400 South, Suite 103
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 263-0300
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, PROVO DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JJBAKD, a Utah General
Partnership,
i

ORDER

i

Civil No. 920-2330 CV

Plaintiff,
vs.
HOWARD HATCH,
Defendant.
On Tuesday, September 22, 1992, at the hour of 11:00 a.m.
a hearing was held on Plaintifffs notice of possession bond which
had been served upon the Defendant, Howard Hatch.

James R. Boud

appeared on behalf of Plaintiff along with representatives of the
Plaintiff.

Howard

Hatch

requested the hearing.

appeared

personally

and

personally

After hearing the arguments of counsel,

James R. Boud, and Defendant, Howard Hatch, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows:
1.

The Court requires the Defendant, Howard Hatch, if

he is to retain possession of the premises, to post a counter-bond
in the form of cash or cashier's check in the amount of $3,500.00.
The Court acknowledges that this bond would have been lower had the
Defendant not requested a jury trial in the above matter and filed

ADDENDUM "A"

a counterclaim.

However, it clearly appears to the Court that with

the complications in the case, and the requested jury trial, that
$3,500.00 is a minimum bond for the Defendant to post in order to
protect Plaintiff for attorney fees and costs that will be expended
in the prosecution and trial of this case. The court acknowledges
that Plaintiff has shown its good faith by posting a $5,000.00
cashier's check with the Court in order to protect the Defendant
should Defendant: prevail.
2.

the

$3,500.00 bond

September 25, 1992, at 5:00 p.m.

shall

be posted

by

Friday,

If said bond is not posted, then

the Clerk of th^ court shall issue a writ of restitution in favor
of the Plaintiff.

it was acknowledged at the hearing that rents

for July, August, and September have not been paid.

If Defendant

does not pay the.se rents into the Court, then Plaintiff shall have
a right to make the rent an issue in this case and proceed with a
summary judgment motion against the Defendant as authorized by Utah
Code Annotated Section 57-16-8.
DATED this

~

day of September, 1992.

U

JUDGE JOHN "BACKLUND
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Order was mailed postage prepaid on the £. ^
day of
September, 1992, to the following:
Howard Hatch
843 South 1150 East
Pleasant Grove, UT 8406

FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT
JJBAKD
Plaintiff,
vs
Howard F. Hatch
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)

MINUTE ENTRY

)
)
)

Dated:

October 6, 1992

Case No. 920002330CV
JUDGE Robert J. Sumsion

MINUTE ENTRY
The Court is in receipt of Defendant's Motion to Disqualify
and Affidavit of Prejudice. After considering the motion, Judge
Robert J. Sumsion, Circuit Court Judge, hereby recuses himself
from this case.

I certify that copies of the foregoing minute entry were mailed,
postage prepaid, on this 7th day of October, 1992, to the
following interested parties:
James R. Boud, 302 W 5400 S, Suite 103, Murray, UT 84107
Howard F. Hatch, 843 S 1150 E, Pleasant Grove, UT 84062

Jerry Clipp
Deputy Court Clerk

ADDENDUM "B"

FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT

JJBAKD, a Utah General
Partnership,
R U L I N G

Plaintiff,
CASE#

vs

920002330 CV

HOWARD HATCH,

Defendant,

I have recused myself for the additional reason that this case may
never get before the Court for final disposition prior to my
retirement date of December 15, 1992. It would seem advisable
that it be assigned a judge who can take it to its final
disposition. I thought we had sufficient time, but Mr. Hatch has
convinced me otherwise.
DATED:

October 9, 1992

Circuit Courfr^Juage
I do hereby certify that copies of the foregoing RULING were
mailed, postage prepaid, on this 14th day of October, 1992 to the
following parties.
James R. Boud, 302 West 5400 South, Suite 103, Murray, Utah 84107
Howard F Hatch, 843 South 1150 East, Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062

Davi Coombs
Circuit Court Clerk

ADDENDUM "C"

James R. Boud, USB #A0388
Bradley R. Jones, USB #A4747
ASHTON, BRAUNBERGER, POULSEN & BOUD, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
302 West 5400 South, Suite 103
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 263-0300
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, PROVO DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JJBAKD, a Utah General
Partnership,

]
f

ORDER

Plaintiff,
i

vs.

Civil No.

920-2330 CV

HOWARD F. HATCH,
Defendant.

Plaintiff's

]

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

having

come

before the above-entitled Court, based upon the pleadings and for
good cause showing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff
shall have Judgment against the Defendant for $680.00 rent; $881.25
attorneys fees for a total of $1,561.25.
IT

IS

FURTHER

ORDERED,

ADJUDGED

AND

DECREED

that

Plaintiff is entitled to restitution of the premises described as
920 South

340 West, Provo, Utah and

that the lease

between the parties is hereby terminated.
1

ADDENDUM "D"

agreement

The Clerk of the Court

is hereby authorized to issue a Writ of Restitution on behalf of
Plaintiff for the purpose of restoring the premises to Plaintiff.
DATED this

day of October, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

Circuit Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Order was mailed postage prepaid on the
I *-» day of
October, 1992, to the following:
Howard F. Hatch
843 South 1150 East
Pleasant Grove, Utah

84062

ASHTON, BRAUNBERGER, POULSEN
& BOUD, P.C.

s^r
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FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT

JJBAKED, a Utah General
Partnership,
Minute Entry
Plaintiff,
CASE#

vs

920002330 CV

HOWARD HATCH,
Defendant.

The assignment of this case was pursuant to the procedure set up
by the Utah Law, that is by the presiding Judge of the Circuit who
is Judge Sumsion.
I have not discussed this case with Judge Sumsion or any other
person and am at this time making it very clear to the parties and
their attorneys that I will accept no phone calls on this case, no
personal contacts and no further letters directed personally to me
and not the file.
Mr. Hatch, I would not know you if you walked through the door,
which of course, based on the above you will not do. I know none
of the parties and have absolutely no desire to know any of the
parties. I have only briefly reviewed the file for purposes of
ruling on a motion. At this moment I could not tell you the
averments of plaintiffs' complaint and who is plaintiff and who is
defendant in the case.
I am a hands on Judge and will play an active part in moving this
case, as I do all my civil cases, through the Court system in
hopefully an efficient and timely way.
The facts of the case and applicable law is all that interests me
in this civil case as all others.
DATED:

November 9, 1992
/

<J

./,'•

Circuit Court Judge

ADDENDUM "E"

L

I do hereby certify that copies of the foregoing Minute Entry
were mailed, postage prepaid, on this 10th day of November, 1992
to the following parties•
Howard F. Hatch, 843 South 1150 East, Pleasant Grove, UT 84062
James R. Boud, 302 West 5400 South, Suite 103, Murray, UT 84107
Davi Coombs
Circuit Court Clerk

CHAPTER 16
MOBILE HOME PARK RESIDENCY
57-16-2.

Purpose of chapter.

The fundamental right to own and protect land and to establish conditions
for its use by others necessitate that the owner of a mobile home park be
provided with speedy and adequate remedies against those who abuse the
terms of a tenancy The high cost of moving mobile homes, the requirements
of mobile home parks relating to their installation, and the cost of land.scaping
and lot preparation necessitate that the owners of mobile homes occupied
within mobile home parks be provided with protection from actual or constructive eviction. It is the purpose of this chapter to provide protection for
both the owners of mobile homes located in mobile home parks and for the
owners of mobile home parks.

57-16-3.

Definitions.

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Mobile home" means a transportable structure in one or more sections with the plumbing, heating, and electrical systems contained within
the unit, which when erected on a site, may be used with or without a
permanent foundation as a family dwelling.
(2) "Mobile home park" means any tract of land on which two or more
mobile home spaces leased, or offered for lease or rent, to accommodate
mobile homes for residential purposes.
(3) "Resident" means an individual who leases or rents space in a mobile home park.
(4) "Mobile home space" means a specific area of land within a mobile
home park designed to accommodate one mobile home.
(5) "Rent" means charges paid for the privilege of occupying a mobile
home space, and may include service charges and fees.
(6) "Service charges" means separate charges paid for the use of electrical and gas service improvements which exist at a mobile home space, or
for trash removal, sewage and water, or any combination of the above.
(7) "Fees" means other charges incidental to a resident's tenancy including, but not limited to, late fees, charges for pets, charges for storage
of recreational vehicles, charges for the use of park facilities, and security
deposits.
(8) "Change of use" means a change of the use of a mobile home park,
or any part of it, for a purpose other than the rental of mobile home
spaces.

57-16-4. Termination of lease by park owner — Requirement for lease agreement.
(1) A mobile home park or its agents may not terminate a lease or rental
agreement upon any ground other than as specified in this chapter.
(2) Each agreement for the lease of mobile home space shall be written and
signed by the parties. Each lease shall contain at least the following information:
(a) the name and address of the mobile home park owner and any
persons authorized to act for the owner, upon whom notice and service of
process may be served;
(b) the type of the leasehold, and whether it be term or periodic;

ADDENDUM "F"

(c) a full disclosure of all rent, service charges, and other fees presently
being charged on a periodic basis:
(d) the date or dates on which the payment of rent, fees, and service
charges are due; and
(e) all rules that pertain to the mobile home park which, if broken, may
constitute grounds for eviction.
(3) Increases in rent or fees for periodic tenancies shall be unenforceable
until 60 days after notice of the increase is mailed to the resident. If service
charges are not included in the rent, service charges may be increased during
the leasehold period after notice to the resident is given, and increases or
decreases in electricity rates shall be passed through to the resident. Increases
or decreases in the total cost of other service charges shall be passed through
to the resident.
The mobile home park may not alter the date or dates on which rent, fees,
and service charges are due unless a 60-day written notice precedes the alteration.
(4) Any rule or condition of a lease purporting to prevent or unreasonably
limit the sale of a mobile home belonging to a resident is void and unenforceable. The mobile home park may, however, reserve the right to approve the
prospective purchaser of a mobile home who intends to become a resident, but
such approval may not be unreasonably withheld. The mobile home park may
require proof of ownership as a condition of approval. The mobile home park
may unconditionally refuse to approve any purchaser of a mobile home who
does not register prior to purchase.
(5) A mobile home park may not restrict a resident's right to advertise for
sale or sell his mobile home. However, the park may limit the size of a "for
sale" sign affixed to the mobile home to not more than 144 square inches.
(6) A mobile home park may not compel a resident who desires to sell his
mobile home, either directly or indirectly, to sell it through an agent designated by the mobile home park.
(7) In order to upgrade the quality of a mobile home park, it may require
that a mobile home be removed from the park upon sale if:
(a) the mobile home does not meet minimum size specifications: or
(b) the mobile home is in rundown condition or in disrepair.

57-16-5.

Grounds for terminating lease.

An agreement for the lease of mobile home space in a mobile home park
may be terminated during its term by mutual agreement or for any one or
more of the following causes:
(1) Failure of a resident to comply with a mobile home park rule for a
period of 15 days after receipt of notice of noncompliance from the mobile
home park;
(2) Repeated failure of a resident to abide by a mobile home park rule,
if the original notice of noncompliance states that another violation of the
same or a different rule might result in forfeiture without any further
period of cure;
(3) Behavior by a resident which substantially endangers the security
and health of the other residents or threatens the property in the park;
(4) Nonpayment of rent, fees, or service charges:
(5) A change in the land use or condemnation of the mobile home park
or any part of it.

A legal action to terminate a lease based upon a caus^ --et tcnn in Secnon
57-16-5 may ^'vT t>e commenced except in accordance wi*- -*P allowing p-oce
dure:
»P Beiore issuance of any summons and complaint, the mobile home
: • i rk -shall send or serve WTItten notice to the resident or subtenant:
a) by delivering a copy of the notice personally;
(b) by sending a copy of the notice through registered or certified
mail addressed to the resident or subtenant at his place of residence;
(c) if the resident or subtenant is absent from his place of residence, by leaving a copy of the notice with some person of suitable
age and discretion at his residence and sending a copy through the
mail addressed to the resident or suhtenant at his place of residence:;
or
I'd) If a person of suitable age or discretion cannot be found, by
affixing a copy of the notice in a conspicuous place on the residents or
subtenant's mobile home and also sending a copy through the mail
addressed to the resident or subtenant at his place of residence.
(2) The notice shall set forth the cause for the notice and, if the cause is
one which can be cured, the time within which the resident has to cure.
The notice shall also set forth the time after which the mobile home park
may commence legal action against the resident ifcure is not effected, as
follows:
(a) In the event of failure to abide by a mobile home park rule, the
notice shall provide for a 15-day cure period except in the case of
repeated violations and, shall state that if a cure is not timely effected, or a written agreement made between the mobile home park
and the resident allowing for a variation in the rule or cure period,
eviction proceedings may be initiated immediately.
(b) If the resident commits repeated violations of a rule, a summons and complaint may be issued three days after a notice is served.
(c) If a resident behaves in a manner that substantially endangers
the well-being or property of other residents, eviction proceedings
may commence immediately.
(d> If a resident does not pay rent, fees, or service charges, tl le
notice shall provide a three-day cure period and, that if cure is not
timely effected, or a written agreement made between the mobile
home park and the resident allowing for a variation in the rule or
cure period, eviction proceedings may be initiated immediately.
(el If there is a planned change in land use or condemnation of the
park, the notice shall provide that the resident has 90 days after
receipt of the notice to vacate the mobile home park if no governmental approval or permits incident to the planned change are required,
and if governmental approval and permits are required, that the
resident has 90 days to vacate the mobile home park after all permits
or approvals incident to the planned change are obtained.
'•*'> If the planned change in land use or condemnation requires the
oval of a governmental agency, the mobile home park, in addition to
equired by Subsection (2)(e), shall send written notice of the
the initial hearing to each resident at least seven days before
the date scheduled for the initial hearing.
(4) Regardless of whether the change of use requires the approval of
any governmental agency, if the resident was not a resident of the mobile
home park at the time the initial change of use notice was issued to
residents the owner shall give notice of the change of use to the resident
before he occupies the mobile home space

(5) Eviction proceedings commenced under this chapter and based on
causes set forth in Subsections 57-16-5(1), (2). and i5> shall be brought in
accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and shall not be
treated as unlawful detainer actions under Chapter 36, Title 78. Eviction
proceedings commenced under this chapter and based on causes of action
set forth in Subsections 57-16-5(3) and (4) may, at the election of the
mobile home park, be treated as actions brought under this chapter and
the unlawful detainer provisions of Chapter 36, Title 78. except, if unlawful detainer is charged, the court shall endorse on the summons the number of days within which the defendant is required to appear and defend
the action, which shall not be less than five days or more than 20 days
from the date of service.

57-16-7.

Rules of parks.

(1) A mobile home park may promulgate rules related to the health, safety,
and appropriate conduct of residents and to the maintenance and upkeep of
such park. No change in rule that is unconscionable is valid. No new or
amended rule shall take effect, nor provide the basis for an eviction notice,
until the expiration of at least 60 days after its promulgation. Each resident,
as a condition precedent to such rule being in effect, shall be provided with a
copy of each new or amended rule that does not appear in their lease agreement.
(2) A mobile home park may specify the type of material used, and the
methods used in the installation of, underskirting, awnings, porches, fences,
or other additions or alterations to the exterior of a mobile home, and may
also specify the tie-down equipment used in a mobile home space, in order to
insure the safety and good appearance of the park; but under no circumstances may it require a resident to purchase such material or equipment
from a supplier designated by the mobile home park.
(3) No mobile home park may charge an entrance fee, exit fee, nor installation fee, but reasonable landscaping and maintenance requirements may be
included in* the mobile home park rules. The resident is responsible for all
costs incident to connection of the mobile home to existing mobile home park
facilities and for the installation and maintenance of the mobile home on the
mobile home space.
(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a mobile home
park from requiring a reasonable initial security deposit.

57-16-8.

Payment of rent and fees during pendency of
eviction proceeding.

If a resident elects to contest an eviction proceeding, all rents, fees, and
service charges due and incurred during the pendency of the action shall be
paid into court according to the current mobile home park payment schedule.
Failure of the resident to pay such amounts may, in the discretion of the court,
constitute grounds for granting summary judgment in favor of the mobile
home park. Upon final termination of the issues between the parties, the court
shall order all amounts paid into court paid to the mobile home park. The
prevailing party is also entitled to court costs and reasonable attorney's fees.

57-16-9.

Lienholder's liability for rent and fees.

Notwithstanding the provisions of § 38-3-2 and § 70A-9-317, the lienholder
of record of a mobile home is primarily liable to the mobile home park owner
or operator for rent and service charges if a mobile home is not removed
within 10 days after receipt of written notice that a mobile home has been
abandoned or that a writ of restitution has been issued. The lienholder, however, is only liable for rent that accrues after receipt of such notice.

wm *r **

utility service to mobile home parks —• Limitation on providers 1 charges.

Local water, sewer, and sanitation entities, including those administered by
municipalities and counties which provide water, sewer, or garbage collection
services shall not receive a greater percentage net return from supplying a
mobile home park than said entity receives from other residential customers.
The net return is determined by taking into consideration the costs of maintenance and depreciation of the mobile home park facilities and all savings on
administrative costs, including cost of billing residents.
R i g h t s a n d ii'im d i e s n o t e x c l u s i v e ,
The rights and remedies gnuiled by this chapter are cumulative and not
exclusive.

57 16-12. Waiver of rights a ncl duties prohibited.
No pa rk or resident may agree to waive any r ight, duty, or privilege confei i sd by this chapter.

5 J 18 -15 1

Eviction proceeding.

(1) Eviction proceedings commenced under this chapter and based on
causes of action set forth in Subsections 57-16-5(1), (2), and (5), and eviction
proceedings commenced under this chapter based on causes of action set forth
in Subsections 57-16-5(3) and (4), where a landlord elects to bring an action
under this chapter and not under the unlawful detainer provisions of Chapter
36, Title 78, shall provide for the following:
(a) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or upon delaul* >>i
judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff may include an order of restitution of the premises. The judgment may also declare the forfeiture of tho
lease or agreement.
(b) The jury or the court, if the proceedings are tried without a jury or
upon the defendant's default, shall also assess the damages resulting to
the plaintiff from any of the following:
(i) waste of the premises during the resident's tenancy ill ivnslf i".
alleged in the complaint and proved; and
(ii) the amount of rent due.
(c) 'The judgment shall also provide for reasonable attorneys1" fees if
they are provided for in the lease or agreement.
(d) If the proceeding is contested, the prevailing party is entitled to
court costs and attorneys' fees, regardless of whether the lease agreement
provides for the same.

CHAPTER
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER
78 36 1

"Foi cible enti y" deli,

E u ery person, is guilty of a forcible e^i*.
-:
(1) by breaking open doors, windows or
.
house, or by
fraud, intimidation or stealth, or by any kind of violence or circumstances
of terror, enters upon or into any real property; or,
(2) after entering peaceably upon real property, turns out by force,
threats or menacing conduct the party in actual possession.

78-36-2,

"I:

dMe detainer" defined.

Every person is guilty of a forcible detainer who eithei :
(1) by force, or by menaces and threats of violence, unlawfully holds
and keeps the possession of any real property, whether the same was
acquired peaceably or otherwise; or,
(2) in the nighttime, or during the absence of the oc ciij; >J int : of anj i eal
property, unlawfully enters thereon, and, after demand made for the surrender thereof, refuses for the period of three days to surrender the same
to such former occupant. The occupant of real property within the meaning of this subdivision is one who within five days preceding such unlawful entry was in the peaceable and undisturbed possession of such lands.

78-36-3. Unlawful detainer by tenant for term less than
life.
r
(1) k tenant of real property, for a term less fhor" i,f
an unlawful detainer:
(a) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, of the
property or any part of it, after the expiration of the specified term or
period for which it is let to him, which specified term or period, whether
established by express or implied contract, or whether written or parol,
shall be terminated without notice at the expiration of the specified term
or period;
(b) when, having leased real property for an indefinite time w ith
monthly or other periodic rent reserved:
(i) he continues in possession of it in person or by subtenant after
the end of any month or period, in cases where the owner, his designated agent, or any successor in estate of the owner, 15 days or more
prior to the end of that month or period, has served notice requiring
him to quit the premises at the expiration of that month or period; or
(ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he remains in possession of
the premises after the expiration of a notice of not less than five days;
(c) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after
default in the payment of any rent and after a notice in writing requiring
in the alternative the payment of the rent or the surrender of the detained premises, has remained uncomplied with for a period of three days
after service, which notice may be served at any time after the rent
becomes due;

ADDENDUM "G"

(d) when he assigns or sublets the leased premises contrary to the
covenants of the lease, or commits or permits waste on the premises, or
when he sets up or carries on any unlawful business on or in the premises,
or when he suffers, permits, or maintains on or about the premises any
nuisance, including nuisance as defined in Section 78-38-9, and remains
in possession after service upon him of a three days* notice to quit; or
(e) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after a
neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or
agreement under which the property is held, other than those previously
mentioned, and after notice in writing requiring in the alternative the
performance of the conditions or covenant or the surrender of the property, served upon him and upon any subtenant in actual occupation of the
premises remains uncomplied with for three days after service. Within
three days after the service of the notice, the tenant, any subtenant in
actual occupation of the premises, any mortgagee of the term, or other
person interested in its continuance may perform the condition or covenant and thereby save the lease from forfeiture, except that if the covenants and conditions of the lease violated by the lessee cannot afterwards
be performed, then no notice need be given.
(2) Unlawful detainer by an owner resident of a mobile home is determined
under Title 57, Chapter 16, Mobile Home Park Residency Act.
(3) The notice provisions for nuisance in Subsection 78-36-3(l)(d) are not
applicable to nuisance actions provided in Sections 78-38-9 through 78-38-16
only.

78-36-4. Right of tenant of agricultural lands to hold over.
In all cases of tenancy upon agricultural lands, where the tenant has held
over and retained possession for more than 60 days after the expiration of his
term without any demand of possession or notice to quit by the owner, his
designated agent, or his successor in estate, he shall be deemed to be held by
permission of the owner, his designated agent, or his successor in estate, and
shall be entitled to hold under the terms of the lease for another full year, and
shall not be guilty of an unlawful detainer during that year; and the holding
over for the 60-day period shall be taken and construed as a consent on the
part of the tenant to hold for another year.

78-36-5. Remedies
available
undertenant.

to

tenant

against

A tenant may take proceedings similar to those prescribed in this chapter to
obtain possession of the premises let to an undertenant in case of his unlawful
detention of the premises underlet to him.

78-36-6. Nntirr to quit

How senvml

The notices required by the preceding sections may be served:
(1) by delivering a copy to the tenant personally;
(2) by sending a copy through registered or certified mail addressed to
the tenant at his place of residence;
(3) if he is absent from his place of residence
, tCkl
business, by leaving a copy with a person of suiur
i*e a-:n ;iscrei.
either place and mailing a copy to the tenant at the address oi his place of
residence or place of business; or
(4) if a person of suitable age or discretion cannot be found at the place
of residence, then by affixing a copy in a conspicuous place on the leased
property, Service upon a subtenant may be made in the same manner.

78-36-7. 1Jecessary parties defend a. *;
(1) No person other than, the tenant of the premisr
is one in the actual occupation of the premises who? •
f
shall be made a party defendant in the proceeding, except as provided in
Section 78-38-13, nor shall any proceeding abate, nor the plaintiff be nonsuited, for the nonjoinder of any person who might have been made a party
defendant; but when it appears that any of the parties served with process or
appearing in the proceedings are guilty, judgment shall be rendered against
those parties.
(2) If a person has become subtenant of the premises in conti o \ ers) af tei
the service of any notice as provided in this chapter, the fact that such notice
was not served on the subtenant is not a defense to the action. All persons who
enter under the tenant after the commencement of the action shall be bound
by the judgment the same as if they had been made parties to the action.
(3) A landlord, owner, or designated agent is a necessary party defendant
only in an abatement by eviction action for an unlawful drug house as provided in Section 78-38-13.

78-36-8- Allegations permitted in complaint — Time Ior
appearance — Service of summons.
The plaintiff in his complaint, in addition to setting « 2 ^ / ^ ^ r
he seeks to recover, may set forth any circumstances of fraud, force, or
teiS^A^S^S
accompanied the alleged forcible entry, or forcible or
u n l a L w f t ? £ 5 S r ? i i d claim damages therefor or compensation for the occupaUon of the premises, or both If the unlawful < ^ ™ ^ ^
default in the payment of rent, the complaint shall state the amount ot rent
d S TOa c ^ S S f i n d « on the summons the number of days within which
the defendant is required to appear and defend the
^^l^f^0^
less than three or more than 20 days from the
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
authorize service by publication or mail for cause shown. Service by public*
SonTc?mplete one7 week after publication. Service by mail is complete three
days after mailing. The summons shall be changed in form to conform to the
time of service as ordered, and,, shall, be served, as in other cases.

78-36-8.5. Possession bond of plaintiff — Alternative remedies.
(1) At any time between the filing of his complaint and the entry of final
judgment, the plaintiff may execute and file a possession bond. The bond may
be in the form of a corporate bond, a cash bond, certified funds, or a property
bond executed by two persons who own real property in the state and who are
not parties to the action. The court shall approve the bond in an amount that
is the probable amount of costs of suit and damages which may result to the
defendant if the suit has been improperly instituted. The bond shall be payable to the clerk of the court for the benefit of the defendant for all costs and
damages actually adjudged against the plaintiff. The plaintiff shall notify the
defendant that he has filed a possession bond. This notice shall be served in
the same manner as service of summons and shall inform the defendant of all
of the alternative remedies and procedures under Subsection (2).
(2) The following are alternative remedies and procedures applicable to an
action if the plaintiff files a possession bond under Subsection (1):
(a) With respect to an unlawful detainer action based solely upon nonpayment of rent or utilities, the existing contract shall remain in force
and the complaint shall be dismissed if the defendant, within three days
of the service of the notice of the possession bond, pays accrued rent,
utility charges, any late fee, and other costs, including attorney's fees, as
provided in the rental agreement.
(b) The defendant may remain in possession if he executes and files a
counter bond in the form of a corporate bond, a cash bond, certified funds,
or a property bond executed by two persons who own real property in the
state and who are not parties to the action. The form of the bond is at the
defendant's option. The bond shall be payable to the clerk of the court.
The defendant shall file the bond prior to the expiration of three days
from the date he is served with notice of the filing of plaintiffs possession
bond. The court shall approve the bond in an amount that is the probable
amount of costs of suit and actual damages that may result to the plaintiff
if the defendant has improperly withheld possession. The court shall consider prepaid rent to the owner as a portion of the defendant's total bond.
(c) The defendant, upon demand, shall be granted a hearing to be held
prior to the expiration of three days from the date the defendant is served
with notice of the filing of plaintiffs possession bond.
(3) If the defendant does not elect and comply with a remedy under Subsection (2) within the required time, the plaintiff, upon ex parte motion, shall be
granted an order of restitution. The constable of the precinct or the sheriff of
the county where the property is situated shall return possession of the property to the plaintiff promptly.
(4) If the defendant demands a hearing under Subsection (2)(c), and if the
court rules after the hearing that the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the
property, the constable or sheriff shall promptly return possession of the property to the plaintiff. If at the hearing the court allows the defendant to remain
in possession and further issues remain to be adjudicated between the parties,
the court shall require the defendant to post a bond as required in Subsection
(2Kb). If at the hearing the court rules that all issues between the parties can
be adjudicated without further court proceedings, the court shall, upon abjudicating those issues, enter judgment on the merits.

78-36-9. Proof required by plaintiff — Defense.
On the trial of any proceeding for any forcible entry or forcible detainer the
plaintiff shall only be required to show, in addition to the forcible entry or
forcible detainer complained of, that he was peaceably in the actual possession
at the time of the forcible entry, or was entitled to the possession at the time of
the forcible detainer. The defendant may show in his defense that he or his
ancestors, or those whose interest in such premises he claims, had been in the
quiet possession thereof for the space of one whole year continuously next
before the commencement of the proceedings, and that his interest therein is
not then ended or determined; and such showing is a bar to the proceedings.

78-36-10. Judgment for restitution, damages, and rent
Immediate enforcement — Treble damages.
(1) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or upon default. A judgment entered in favor of the plaintifT shall include an order for the restitution
of the premises. If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after neglect or
failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or agreement under
which the property is held, or after default in the payment of rent, the judgment shall also declare the forfeiture of the lease or agreement.
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried without a jury or upon
the defendant's default, shall also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff
from any of the following:
(a) forcible entry;
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer;
(c) waste of the premises during the v
mi \\ I w^iv is
alleged in the complaint and proved at t
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged u n u vtui detainer is after
default in the payment of rent; and
(e) the abatement of the nuisance by eviction as provided in Sections
78-38-9 through 78-38-16
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for the rent, for
three times the amount of the damages assessed under Subsections (2)(a)
through (2)(c), and for reasonable attorney's fees, if they are provided for in
the lease or agreement.
(4) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after default in the payment of
the rent, execution upon the judgment shall be issued immediately after the
(IRINMII

III

(ill cimm, the judgment may be issued and enforced

78-36-11- Time for appeal.
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), either party may, within ten days,
appeal from the judgment rendered.
(2) In a nuisance action under Sections 78-38-9 through 78-38-16, an) pai tj
may appeal from, the judgment rendered within, three clays

78-36-12. Exclusion of tenant without judicial process prohibited — Abandoned premises excepted.
It is unlawful for an owner to willfully exclude a tenant from the tenant's
premises in any manner except by judicial process, provided, an owner or his
agent shall not be prevented from removing the contents of the leased premises under Subsection 78-36-12.6(2) and retaking the premises and attempting
to rent them at a fair rental value when the tenant has abandoned the premises.

78-36-12.3. Definitions.
(1) "Willful exclusion" means preventing the tenant from entering into the
premises with intent to deprive the tenant of such entry.
(2) "Owner" means the actual owner of the premises and shall also have the
same meaning as landlord under common law and the statutes of this state.
(3) "Abandonment" is presumed in either of the following situations:
(a) The tenant has not notified the owner that he or she will be absent
from the premises, and the tenant fails to pay rent within 15 days after
the due date, and there is no reasonable evidence other than the presence
of the tenants personal property that the tenant is occupying the premises; or
(b) The tenant has not notified the owner that he or she will be absent
from the premises, and the tenant fails to pay rent when due and the
tenant's personal property has been removed from the dwelling unit and
there is no reasonable evidence that the tenant is occupying the premises.

78-36-12.6. Abandoned premises — Retaking and
rerenting by owner — Liability of tenant — Personal property of tenant left on premises.
(1) In the event of abandonment the owner may retake the premises and
attempt to rent them at a fair rental value and the tenant who abandoned the
premises shall be liable:
(a) for the entire rent due for the remainder of the term; or
(b) for rent accrued during the period necessary to re-rent the premises
at a fair rental value, plus the difference between the fair rental value
and the rent agreed to in the prior rental agreement, plus a reasonable
commission for the renting of the premises and the costs, if any, necessary
to restore the rental unit to its condition when rented by the tenant less
normal wear and tear. This subsection applies, if less than Subsection (a)
notwithstanding that the owner did not re-rent the premises.
(2) If the tenant has abandoned the premises and has left personal property
on the premises, the owner is entitled to remove the property from the dwelling, store it for the tenant, and recover actual moving and storage costs from
the tenant. The owner shall make reasonable efforts to notify the tenant of the
location of the personal property; however, if the property has been in storage
for over 30 days and the tenant has made no reasonable effort to recover it,
the owner may sell the property and apply the proceeds toward any amount
the tenant owes. Any money left over from the sale of the property shall be
handled as specified in Section 78-44-18. Nothing contained in this act shall
be in derogation of or alter the owner's rights under Title 38, Chapter 3.

c43 South 11bu Ldst
Pleasant b r o v e , U c -

"

i 111 i MIT

IN / IJU I ul

UIAI

DIM

LUUNTi,

JJBAKD, a Utah General P a r t n e r s h i p ,

IHI

)
j
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.

HOWARD F. I lATCt I
- _

I I nun M'PARTMI III

p-r—
( ,

)
)

Defendant.

ill

UTAH

DEFENDANT'S
:-TT OF IMPECUNI0SI1 Y
i ,• 920-2330 C 4

Judge MC6UIRE
_
_ _ _ _

S t a t e or U t a h ,
:ss
1 ' I i t . a ! in

'

Tl re A f f i a i i t ,
1
2

'

'

•

Howard F, Hatch t says and a v e r s as f o l l o w s :

I I lat I am 1 *
IIi

'

"'-- r

P nm^ w

-'ler.

:•*•*.

• Ii ni •

expenses

t l le a ^ t c .

Ltiievf*

it is t l , ;

••"

>
-

*

^ ** -

••..
'-

| , Q T

M C jnu i
-J^

such ar. u K K c u l .

Fun ' t l nei , t l lie ' 1

SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED TO t h i s

j ^ t l a y o f J a n u a r y , 1993.

ADDENDUM

"H"

i

OPERATION o r THE C'M'Tr7^

Rule

">01

, rr:,
in U t a h
^ n d e d effective • i a n u a r v 15, i9l*0; April 15. i D i i l , - K i n u a i > 1. 1992. I*^brui. 1993.)
Amend ment Notes. — The 1990 amendment renumbered this rule, formerly Rule
4-405; added the phrase beginning "and to" under Applicability"; added "Upon initial application, and thereafter" to the beginning of Subdivision (1); in Subdivision (1)(C), inserted the
subdivision designation (i) and added Subdivisions (ii) through (vii); redesignated former
Subdivision (1)(D) as Subdivision (D(CXxiii);
redesignated former Subdivision (IKE) as Subdivision <1)(D); redesignated former Subdivisions (IMF) through (J) as Subdivisions
(IHCHviii) through (xii) and in Subdivision
iviii) substituted "existing in Utah or any
other state" for uin any court of the state";
added Subdivisions (2XA) through (C), (3), (4),
and iSKA) and the first two sentences in Subdivision (5KB), making former Subdivision (3)
the third sentence in present Subdivision
5)(B)\ deleted former Subdivision (4), providing for full faith and credit among courts for
orders qualifying sureties; redesignated former
Subdivisions (5) through (7) as Subdivisions
(5)(C) and (D) and (6); substituted "circuit" for
"court" in Subdivision l5KC); substituted "presiding judge" for "court" in two places in Subdivision (5KD); substituted "March 1st" for "February 28th" in Subdivision (6); added Subdivision (7); and made stylistic changes throughout
The 1!)91 amendment KI Subdivision ll)
jddod "or if the statement is made on behalf of

Rule

2fw

a business or corporation, a statement that the
business or corporation" to the introductory
language of paragraph (C) and made stylistic
changes; rewrote Subdivision (2) to delete language relating to appraisals and inserted "prepared by a certified public accountant"; redesignated former Subdivision (2)(C) as present
Sn ibdivision (3), added p r e s e n t Subdivision (4) t

and renumbered the remaining subdivisions
accord i ngly, mak i ng appropria te ref ere nee
changes throughout; in present Subdivision
(3), deleted "audited" before "financial statement" and substituted "surety" for "company"
in the first sentence and substituted "the
value" for "a ratio of bond dollars to letter of
credit dollars" in the second sentence; in
present Subdivision (5), substituted "current
assets" for "real assets" in two places; and rewrote present Subdivision (6) to delete a table
setting out the ratio of bond dollars outstanding to net worth value.
The 1992 amendment substituted "Commercial" for "qualifications of in the rule heading,
inserted "re-qualification and disqualification"
and "commercial" in the Intent section, and
substantially rewrote the rule.
The 1993 amendment, effective February 1,
1993, in Subdivision (6) added the designation
(A), deleted "the lesser of $500,000 or" after
"exceed" in Subdivision (A), and added Subdivision (B),

oeations of trial courts <*! ocord.

Intent:
To designate locations of trial courts of record.
*iw.r»u;i;

Tins rule shall nprilv *-^ all trial courts of record.
Statement of t h e

Ruie

1

1) Each . --UI.LV seat and the following municipalities are hereby designated a^ locations of trial courts of record: American Fork; Bountiful; O d a r
1
*ity; Clearfield; Kaysville; Layton; Murray; Orem; Park City; Roosevelt; : -.,\\
Salem; Sandy; Spanish Fork; West Valley City.
<2) Subject to limitations imposed by law, a trial court of record A ^n\
subject m a t t e r jurisdiction may hold court in any location designated by this
rule.
'Added effective J a n u a r y 1, 1992.)

ARTICLE 5.
CIVIL PRACTICE.
Kale 4-oOL Motions.
ntent:
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda
td documents with the court.

ar
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To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on
dispositive motions
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all district and circuit courts
except proceedings before the court commissioners and the small claims department of the circuit court This rule does not apply to petitions for habeas
corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda.
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, except uncontested or ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum of
points and authorities appropriate affidavits, and copies of or citations by
page number to relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other documents relied upon in support of the motion Memoranda supporting or
opposing a motion shall not exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the
"statement of material facts" as provided in paragraph (2), except as
waived by order of the court on ex-parte application If an ex-parte application is made to file an over-length memorandum, the application shall
state the length of the principal memorandum, and if the memorandum is
in excess of ten pages, the application shall include a summary of the
memorandum, not to exceed five pages
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The responding party
shall file and serve upon all parties within ten days after service of a
motion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion, and all supporting
documentation If the responding party fails to file a memorandum m
opposition to the motion within ten days after service of the motion, the
moving party may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court for
decision as provided in paragraph (l)(d) of this rule
(c) Reply memorandum. The moving party may serve and file a reply
memorandum within five days after service of the responding party's
memorandum
(d) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration of the five-day
period to file a reply memorandum, either party may notify the Clerk to
submit the matter to the court for decision The notification shall be in
the form of a separate written pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit
for Decision " The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all
parties If neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for
decision
(2) Motions for summary judgment.
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authorities in support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a
section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which
movant contends no genuine issue exists The facts shall be stated in
separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions
of the record upon which the movant relies
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a
section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which the
party contends a genuine issue exists Each disputed fact shall be stated
in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's facts
that are disputed All material facts set forth in the movant's statement
and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be
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deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment u t i l e s -p-vr"..
caliy controverted by the opposing party's statement.
i.)> H e a r i n g s .
;
.-u A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless
,rdered by the Court, or requested by the parties as provided in paragraphs (3Mb) or (4) below.
h' In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action
<uiy issues in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at
itie time of filing the principal memorandum in support of or in opposition
to a motion may file a written request for a hearing.
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the court fincL mu
;u>
m o t i o n o r opposition to t h e m o t i o n is frivolous o r (b) t h a t t h e di. .><>>.. ive
issue or set of issues governing the granting or denial of the motion *\i
been authoritatively decided.
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the
requesting party. When a request for hearing is granted, the court shall
set the m a t t e r for hearing or notify the requesting party that the matter
shall be heard and the requesting party shall schedule the matter for
hearing and notify all parties of the date and time.
(e) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy of the
motion, memorandum of points and authorities and all documents supporting or opposing the motion shall be delivered to the judge hearing the
m a t t e r at least two working days before the date set for hearing. Copies
shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies and indicate the date and time
of the hearing. Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk of the
court.
(0 If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the pai . . i file their principal memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed
waived.
(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty i30) days before the scheduled trial date. No dispositive motions shall bv heard a r - •
that date without leave of the Court.
(4) E x p e d i t e d d i s p o s i t i o n s . Upon motion and notice and for good cause
shown, the court may grant a request for an expedited disposition in any c-sr
where time is of the essence and compliance with the provisions of this rule
would be impracticable or where the motion does not raise significant legal
issues and could be resolved summarily.
(5) T e l e p h o n e conference. The court on its own motion or at a party's
request may direct arguments of any motion by telephone conference without
court appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all telephone arguments
and the rulings thereon if requested by counsel.
(Amended effective J a n u a r y 15, 1990; April 15, i ^ i
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . - The 1990 amendment rewrote this rule to such an extent that a
detailed description is impracticable.
The 1991 amendment deleted "and a copy of

the proposed order" following supporting documentation" in Subdivision (1Kb) and made related stylistic changes and inserted "principal"
in Subdivision (3)(b).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

When
Cited.

• "=IM 6.

When r u l e a p p l i e s .
Because the defendants' Rule 56(e) objection
to the plaintiffs first affidavit was framed as a
separate, written motion to strike, the plaintiff

should have been given ten days to respond, as
prescribed by Subdivision (1Mb) of this rule.
Gillmor v. Cummings, 806 P.2d 1205 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991).
Cited in Huston v. Lewis. 818 P.2d 531
(Utah 1991); Lucero v. Warden of Utah State
Prison, 841 P.2d 1230 <l 'tan Ct. App. 1992).

